Most experimental realizations of quantum key distribution are based on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (so-called BB84) protocol. In a typical optical implementation of this scheme, the sender uses an active source to produce the required BB84 signal states. While active state preparation of BB84 signals is a simple and elegant solution in principle, in practice passive state preparation might be desirable in some scenarios, for instance, in those experimental setups operating at high transmission rates. Passive schemes might also be more robust against side-channel attacks than active sources. Typical passive devices involve parametric down-conversion. In this paper, we show that both coherent light and practical single photon sources are also suitable for passive generation of BB84 signal states. Our method does not require any external-driven element, but only linear optical components and photodetectors. In the case of coherent light, the resulting key rate is similar to the one delivered by an active source. When the sender uses practical single photon sources, however, the distance covered by a passive transmitter might be longer than the one of an active configuration.
I. INTRODUCTION
The transmission of secret information over an insecure communication channel constitutes an essential resource in modern information society. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows two distant parties (typically called Alice and Bob) to establish a secure secret key despite the computational and technological power of an eavesdropper (Eve), who interferes with the signals [1] . This secret key is the main ingredient of the one-time-pad or Vernam cipher [2] , the only known encryption method that can deliver information-theoretic secure communications.
Most experimental realizations of QKD are based on the so-called BB84 QKD scheme introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [3] . In a typical quantum optical implementation of this protocol, Alice sends to Bob phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCP) with usual average photon number of 0.1 or higher [4, 5] . These states can be easily generated using only standard semiconductor lasers and calibrated attenuators. Each light pulse may be prepared in a different polarization state, which is selected, independently and randomly for each signal, between two mutually unbiased bases, e.g., either a linear (H [horizontal] or V [vertical] ) or a circular (L [left] or R [right]) polarizations basis. On the receiving side, Bob measures each incoming signal by choosing at random between two polarization analyzers, one for each possible basis. Once this quantum communication phase is completed, Alice and Bob use an authenticated public channel to process their data and obtain a secure secret key. This last procedure, called key distillation, involves, typically, local randomization, error correction to reconcile Alice's and Bob's data, and privacy amplication to decouple their data from Eve [6] . A full proof of the security for the BB84 QKD protocol with WCP has been given in Refs. [7, 8] . The performance of this scheme can be improved further if the original hardware is slightly modified. For instance, one can use the so-called decoystate method [9, 10] , where Alice varies the mean photon number of each signal state she sends to Bob. The measurement results associated to different intensity settings allow the legitimate users to obtain a better estimation of the behavior of the quantum channel. This translates into an enhancement of the achievable secret key rate, which can now basically reach the performance of single photon sources (SPS).
The preparation of the BB84 signal states is usually realized by means of an active source. For simplicity, we will first consider polarization encoding. (Note that phase encoding is mathematically equivalent to polarization encoding. Later in this paper, we will also consider phase encoding.) There are two main configurations; they are illustrated in Fig. 1 as cases A and B. In the first one (case A in the figure), Alice uses four laser diodes, one for each possible BB84 signal [4] . These lasers are controlled by a random number generator (RNG) [11] that decides each given time which one of the 4 diodes is triggered. The second configuration (case B in the figure) uses only one single laser diode in combination with a polarization modulator which is controlled by a RNG [5] . This modulator can rotate the state of polarization of the signals produced by the source. While active state preparation is a simple and elegant solution to implement the BB84 protocol in principle, in practice passive state preparation might be desirable in some scenarios [12] [13] [14] ; for instance, in those experimental setups operating at high transmission rates, since no RNG is required in a passive device. A passive transmitter allows Alice to generate different quantum states at random without the need to use an external source of randomness. This situation is illustrated as case C in Fig. 1 . Alice can use one or more light sources to produce different signal states that are sent through a linear optics network. Depending on the detection pattern observed in her detectors D i , she can infer which signal states are actually generated. So far, only entanglementbased (EB) QKD systems have been designed to operate entirely in a passive regime without any externaldriven elements [12, 15] this article, we show that both coherent light and practical SPS are also suitable for passive generation of BB84 signal states, i.e., one does not need a nonlinear optics network preparing entangled states in order to passively generate BB84 signals. Practical SPS (also called "subPoissonian sources") are those light sources which have a smaller probability of emitting two or more photons than an attenuated laser. Our method requires only linear optical elements and photodetectors. In the asymptotic limit of an infinite long experiment, it turns out that the secret key rate of a passive source with coherent light is similar to the one delivered by an active source. When Alice uses practical SPS, however, the distance covered by a passive transmitter might be longer than the one of an active configuration. This result is caused by the capacity of the passive scheme to reduce the multiphoton probability of the source via a post-selection mechanism.
Passive schemes might also be more robust than active systems to side-channel attacks hidden in the imperfections of the optical components. If a polarization modulator is not properly designed, for example, it may distort some of the physical parameters of the pulses emitted by the sender depending on the particular value of the polarization setting selected. This fact could open a security loophole in the active schemes.
The article is organized as follows. In Sec. II we present and evaluate the performance of a passive BB84 state preparation scheme that can operate with coherent light. Then, in Sec. III we consider the case where Alice uses practical SPS. Finally, Sec. IV concludes the article with a summary. The paper includes as well a few appendixes with additional calculations.
II. PASSIVE TRANSMITTER WITH COHERENT LIGHT
The basic setup is rather simple. It is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Suppose two phase-randomized strong coherent pulses prepared, respectively, in +45
• and −45
• linear polarization, interfere at a polarizing beamsplitter Now, to prepare the signal states that are sent to Bob, Alice performs a polarization measurement followed by a post-selection step. By assumption, we have that the intensity υ of the signals σ out is very high. Therefore, Alice can always employ, for instance, a BS of very small transmittance (t ≪ 1) to split these states into two light beams: one very weak suitable for QKD, and one strong. The weak signal is sent to Bob through the quantum channel (see Fig. 2 ). The strong beam is used to measure its polarization by means of a polarization measurement which, for simplicity, we assume is perfect. For each incoming signal, this device provides Alice with a precise value for the measured angle θ. In this situation, the conditional states emitted by the source can be described as where θ denotes the value of the angle obtained by Alice's polarization measurement, and µ is given by µ = υt. In practice, however, as we will show below, it is sufficient if the polarization measurement tells Alice the value of θ within a certain interval. Whenever θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} Alice generates one of the four BB84 polarization states perfectly. Note that the creation operators for the polarizations modes in the BB84 protocol, which we shall denote as b †
R , can be expressed, in terms of the operators a † ±45 • , as:
In general, Alice does not need to restrict herself to only those events where she actually prepares a perfect BB84 state, since the probability associated with these ideal events tends to zero. Instead, she can also accept signals with a polarization sufficiently close to the desired ones. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 3 , where Alice selects some valid regions for the angle θ. These regions are marked with grey color in the figure. They depend on an acceptance parameter Ω ∈ [0, π/4] that we optimize. Specifically, whenever the value of θ lies within any of the intervals ψ ± (π/4 − Ω) with ψ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}, then Alice considers the pulse emitted by the source as a valid signal. This last condition can also be written as
Otherwise, the pulse is discarded afterwards during the post-processing phase of the protocol, and it does not contribute to the key rate. The probability that a pulse is accepted, p acc , is given by
To increase this probability, one can reduce the value of Ω. Note, however, that this action also results in an increase of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the protocol, that we shall denote as E. On the other hand, when Ω increases, we have that both p acc and E decrease.
There is a trade-off on the acceptance parameter Ω. A high acceptance probability p acc favors Ω ≈ 0, whereas a low QBER favors Ω ≈ π/4. Note that in the limit where Ω tends to π/4 we recover the standard BB84 protocol.
A. Lower bound on the secret key rate
The single photon signals emitted by the passive source presented above, averaged over the values of Alice's key bit, are basis-independent. That is, they do not leak any information to Eve about the basis of Alice's signal states. To see this, note that
for all Ω ∈ [0, π/4], and where the single photon state |1 θ is given by Eq. (3). Here 1 1 denotes the identity operator in the single photon subspace.
To evaluate the performance of this passive source we use the security analysis provided by GottesmanLo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) in Ref. [8] . See also Ref. [16] . It considers that Eve can always obtain full information about the part of the key generated from the multiphoton signals. This pessimistic assumption is also true for the passive transmitter illustrated in Fig. 2 when Alice and Bob use only unidirectional classical communication during the public-discussion phase of the protocol. This result arises from the fact that all the photons contained in a pulse are prepared in the same polarization state and, therefore, no secret key can be distilled with one-way post-processing techniques [17] . Note, however, that such security analysis could leave still room for improvement when Alice and Bob employ two-way classical communication. In this situation, it might be possible to obtain secret key even from the multiphoton pulses since the signal states prepared by the passive device are already mixed at the source. This last scenario, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
We further assume the typical initial post-processing step in the BB84 protocol, where double click events are not discarded by Bob, but they are randomly assigned to single click events [18, 19] . The secret key rate formula can be written as [8] 
The parameter q is the efficiency of the protocol (q = 1/2 for the standard BB84 protocol, and q ≈ 1 for its efficient version [20] ); Q is the gain, i.e., the probability that Bob obtains a click in his measurement apparatus when Alice sends him a signal state; f (E) is the efficiency of the error correction protocol as a function of the error rate E [21] , typically f (E) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit f (E) = 1; H(x) is the binary Shannon entropy function defined as
; p multi is the multiphoton probability of the source, i.e.,
and E 1 denotes an upper bound on the single photon error rate. In the case of the standard BB84 protocol without decoy-states, this last quantity is given by [8] 
For simulation purposes we use the channel model and detection device on Bob's side described in Appendix A. This model allows us to calculate the observed experimental parameters Q and E. These quantities are given in Appendix B. Our results, however, can also be applied to any other quantum channel or detection setup, as they depend only on the observed gain and QBER.
The resulting lower bound on the secret key rate is illustrated in Fig. 4 (dashed line). In our simulation we employ the following experimental parameters: the dark count rate of Bob's detectors is ǫ B = 1 × 10 −6 , the overall transmittance of his detection apparatus is η B = 0.1, and the loss coefficient of the quantum channel is α = 0.2 dB/km. We further assume that q = 1/2, and f (E) = 1.22. These data are used as well for the simulations included in Sec. III. With this configuration, it turns out that the optimal value of the mean photon number µ decreases with the distance, while the value of the parameter Ω increases. In particular, µ diminishes from ≈ 0.084 to approximately 4 × 10 −3 , while Ω augments from ≈ 0.365 to ≈ 0.76. This result is not surprising. At long distances the gain Q of the protocol is very low and, therefore, it is especially important to keep both the multiphoton probability of the source, and the intrinsic error rate of the signals ρ out,θ , also low. Fig. 4 includes an inset plot with the optimized parameters µ (dashed line) and Ω (solid line). This figure shows as well a lower bound on the secret key rate for the case of an active source. The cutoff point where the secret key rate drops down to zero is basically the same in both cases. It is given by l ≈ 67.5 km. This result arises from two main limiting factors: the multiphoton probability (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive source illustrated in Fig. 2 (dashed line). The signal states ρ out,θ are given by Eq. (6) . For simulation purposes, we consider the following experimental parameters: the dark count rate of Bob's detectors is ǫB = 1 × 10 −6 , the overall transmittance of Bob's detection apparatus is ηB = 0.1, the loss coefficient of the channel is α = 0.2 dB/km, q = 1/2, and the efficiency of the error correction protocol is f (E) = 1.22. The solid line represents a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active source. The inset figure shows the value for the optimized parameters µ (dashed line) and Ω (solid line) in the passive setup.
of the source, and the dark count rate of Bob's detectors. Note that in these simulations we do not consider any misalignment effect in the channel or in Bob's detection apparatus. From the results shown in Fig. 4 we see that the performance of the passive scheme is similar to the one of an active setup, thus showing the practical interest of the passive source. The (relatively small) difference between the achievable secret key rates in both scenarios is due to two main factors: (a) the probability p acc to accept a pulse emitted by the source, which is p acc < 1 in the passive setup, and p acc = 1 in the active scheme, and (b) the intrinsic error rate of the signals accepted by Alice, that is zero only in the case of an active source.
B. Alternative implementation scheme
The passive setup shown in Fig. 2 requires that Alice employs two independent sources of phase-randomized strong coherent pulses. Alternatively to this scheme, Alice could as well employ, for instance, the device illustrated in Fig. 5 . This setup has only one laser diode, but follows a similar spirit like the original scheme shown in Fig. 2 , where a polarization measurement is used to determine the polarization of the incoming signals. The main idea is just to replace two single light pulses emitted by two different diodes with two consecutive light pulses generated by only one laser diode.
To keep the analysis simple, the scheme includes as well an intensity modulator (IM) to block either all the even or all the odd pulses in mode a (see Fig. 5 ). The main reason for blocking half of these pulses is to suppress possible correlations between them. That is, the action of the IM guarantees that the signals that go to Bob are precisely tensor product of states of the form given by Eq. (6) . This way we can directly apply the security evaluation provided in the previous section. This transmitter requires, therefore, an active control of the functioning of the IM. Note, however, that this configuration might still be much less of a problem than using a polarization modulator to actively generate BB84 signal states at high rates, since no RNG is needed to control the IM. Thanks to the one-pulse delay introduced by one arm of the interferometer, it can be shown that both setups in Fig. 2 and Fig. 5 are completely equivalent, except from the resulting secret key rate. More precisely, the secret key rate in the passive scheme with two lasers is double than that in the setup illustrated in Fig. 5 , since half of the pulses are now discarded.
To conclude, let us mention that similar ideas to the ones presented in this section can also be used in other implementations of the BB84 protocol with a different signal encoding. One example are those QKD experiments based on phase encoding, which turns out to be more suitable to use in combination with optical fibers than polarization encoding [1] . This situation is illustrated in Fig. 6 , where now Alice uses a BS of very small transmittance (t ≪ 1) to split phase-randomized strong coherent pulses into two light beams. The strong beam is used to measure the value of its phase relative to some local reference phase by means of a phase measurement, while Alice sends the weak signal to Bob. Like in the passive source shown in Fig. 2 , Alice can select some valid regions for the measured phase, and the analysis presented before also applies straightforwardly to this scenario. 
III. PASSIVE TRANSMITTER WITH SINGLE PHOTON SOURCES
The passive state preparation schemes with coherent light introduced in the previous section deliver a key generation rate of order O(η 2 sys ), where η sys denotes the overall transmittance of the system. To achieve higher secure key rates over longer distances there are two main alternatives: To combine them with the decoy-state method [9, 10] , or to employ SPS. In the first case, Alice can vary the mean photon number of the BB84 signals just by using a variable optical attenuator or a passive decoystate setup [14] . Here, we will concentrate on the second scenario, and we present a simple passive BB84 source which uses practical SPS. Note that the passive transmitters analyzed in Sec. II cannot be employed with SPS, since those setups need to operate with light pulses of sufficiently high intensity to be able to measure their polarization with certain precision.
The basic setup is illustrated in Fig. 7 . It contains four light sources, each of them preparing a different BB84 polarization state. The working principle of this device is rather simple. Let us first consider the ideal case. That is, each photon source in the figure emits precisely one single photon in the desired polarization state, and all detectors have perfect detection efficiency (η det = 1) and dark count rate ǫ A equal to zero. In this scenario, we have that whenever Alice observes a click in precisely three of the "signal detectors" D H , D V , D L , and D R , and no click in detector D (see Fig. 7 ), the state generated by the source, that we shall denote as ρ out,j with j ∈ {H, V, L, R}, consists of just one photon prepared in the polarization state associated with the signal detector D j which did not click. For example, suppose that Alice obtains a click in detectors D V , D L , and D R , and no click in detectors D H and D, then the output state is given by ρ out,H = |1, 0 l 1, 0|, where |1, 0 l denotes a Fock state with one photon in the horizontal polarization mode and zero photons in the vertical polarization mode.
In order to evaluate the performance of this setup in a more realistic scenario, we shall consider practical SPS emitting Fock diagonal states of the form
with j ∈ {H, V, L, R}. Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that the photon number distribution p n of each source is the same for all them, independently of their polarization.
To characterize the threshold single photon detectors
, and D, we use a POVM with two elements, F vac and F click , given by
and F click = 1 1 − F vac , where again the parameter η det denotes the detection efficiency of the detector, and ǫ A represents its probability of having a dark count. We assume that ǫ A is, to a good approximation, independent of the incoming signals. The outcome of F vac corresponds to no click in the detector, while the operator F click gives precisely one detection click, which means at least one photon is detected. After a tedious calculation, one can obtain the conditional output state ρ out,j given that Alice observes a click only in three of the signal detectors D i and no click in detectors D and D j (with j = i). A mathematical expression for this state, together with its associated probability, is given in Appendix C.
A. Lower bound on the secret key rate Like in Sec. II A, the single photon signals emitted by the passive source illustrated in Fig. 7 are also basisindependent. To analyze the performance of this source we use again the security results provided by GLLP in Ref. [8] . See also Ref. [16] . The secret key rate formula is given by Eq. (11) . Note, however, that such security analysis might overestimate the eavesdropping capabilities of Eve in this scenario even when Alice and Bob use one-way post-processing techniques during the public-discussion phase of the protocol. In contrast to the case analyzed in Sec. II, now multiphoton pulses can contain photons prepared in different polarization states. This effect is similar to the one observed in those EB implementations of the BB84 protocol that use, for instance, a pulsed type-II down conversion source [22] . In this sense, the passive source shown in Fig. 7 might be more robust against the Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack [23] than an active one, since now Eve might not be able to obtain always full information about the part of the key generated with the multiphoton signals. Still, the multiphoton problem is now on Bob's side who gets a noisy signal, which can contain photons not prepared in Alice's state. The possibility to distill a secret key from multiphoton pulses in this situation constitutes an interesting theoretical question that deserves further investigations, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
To evaluate the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (11), we need to obtain the gain Q, the error rate E, and the multiphoton probability p multi of the source. These parameters are calculated in Appendix D. For that, we use again the channel model and detection device described in Appendix A. The resulting lower bound on R is illustrated in Figs. 8, 9 , and 10, for three different photon number distributions p n of the practical SPS. For simulation purposes, we use the same experimental data employed in Sec. II A, and we further assume that Alice's detectors have a dark count rate ǫ A = 1 × 10 −6 . The first example plotted in Fig. 8 considers the case of perfect on-demand SPS, i.e., we impose p 1 = 1 in Eq. (14) . We study three different situations, depending on the actual value of the efficiency η A of Alice's detectors, and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS's on Alice's side for each case. In particular, we assume η A = 1, η A = 0.5, and η A = 0.1. This figure includes as well a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active source that emits single photon pulses (thick solid line). The cutoff points where the secret key rate drops down to zero are given by l ≈ 201.7 km (passive source with η A = 1), l ≈ 179.3 km (passive source with η A = 0.5), l ≈ 162.5 km (passive source with η A = 0.1), and l ≈ 203 km (active scheme). From the results shown in this figure we see that, in this ideal scenario where p 1 = 1, the performance of the passive scheme is similar to the one of an active setup only when the efficiency of Alice's detectors is relatively high. Note that the difference between the achievable secret key rates in both scenarios comes (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive setup illustrated in Fig. 7 with perfect on-demand SPS, i.e., p1 = 1 in Eq. (14) . In the simulation we consider the following experimental parameters: the dark count rate of Alice's and Bob's detectors is ǫA = ǫB = 1 × 10 −6 , the overall transmittance of Bob's detection apparatus is ηB = 0.1, the loss coefficient of the channel is α = 0.2 dB/km, q = 1/2, and the efficiency of the error correction protocol is f (E) = 1.22. We further assume the channel model described in Appendix A, where we neglect any misalignment effect. Otherwise, the actual secure distance will be smaller. The figure includes three cases, depending on the actual value of the efficiency ηA of Alice's detectors, and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS's on Alice's side for each case. In particular, we assume ηA = 1 (dashed line), ηA = 0.5 (thin solid line), and ηA = 0.1 (dashdotted line). The solid line represents a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active source that emits single photon pulses with probability one.
mainly from the probability p acc < 1 that Alice's transmitter produces a valid signal in the passive scheme (i.e., three of her signals detectors click). Specifically, when the efficiency η A of Alice's detectors is too low, then also the probability p acc decreases significantly, and therefore the secret key rate decreases as well. The value of η A also influences the resulting cutoff points for the secret key rate. For instance, when η A decreases, the intrinsic noise of Alice's signals (i.e., the probability to produce a wrong signal) can increase due to the dark counts of her detectors. Note that this effect becomes more relevant for low η A . As a result, the cutoff point for the secret key rate decreases.
The other two examples illustrated in Figs. 9 and 10 analyze the influence that the vacuum and multiphoton probabilities of the practical SPS can have on the final secret key rate. For that, we consider two different photon number distributions p n for the SPS described in Eq. (14) . In particular, Fig. 9 shows the case where p 0 = 0.0099, p 1 = 0.9882, and p 2 = 1 − p 0 − p 1 = 0.0019, while Fig. 10 assumes p 0 = 0.2, p 1 = 0.785, and p 2 = 1 − p 0 − p 1 = 0.015. In both cases, we evaluate the same three scenarios contemplated in Fig. 8, i. e., we (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive setup illustrated in Fig. 7 with imperfect SPS. In particular, we consider that the photon number distribution pn of the sources is given by p0 = 0.0099, p1 = 0.9882, and p2 = 1 − p0 − p1 = 0.0019. We further assume the same experimental data used in Fig. 8 . We study three cases, depending on the actual value of the efficiency ηA of Alice's detectors, and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS's on Alice's side for each case. Specifically, we assume ηA = 1 (dashed line), ηA = 0.5 (thin solid line), and ηA = 0.1 (dash-dotted line). The solid line represents a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active source with photon number distribution pn in combination with a BS. In this last case, we optimize the value of the transmittance of the BS as a function of the distance.
consider η A = 1, η A = 0.5, and η A = 0.1. As expected, when the vacuum probability p 0 augments, the probability p acc decreases and, therefore, the secret key rate decreases as well. Similarly, if the multiphoton probability p 2 increases, the intrinsic noise of Alice's signals also augments, and both the secret key rate and its cutoff point decreases. For comparison purposes, we consider as well the situation where Alice uses an active source (thick solid line) in combination with a BS whose transmittance is optimized with the distance. In this last case, the slope of the lower bound on R (when Alice employs an active setup) increases slightly when the transmittance of this additional BS starts to be less than one. This occurs, respectively, at l ≈ 71 km (see Fig. 9 ), and l ≈ 22 km (see Fig. 10 ). From these results, we see that also in these two examples the performance of the passive scheme is comparable to the one of an active setup when η A is sufficiently high. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the distance covered by a passive transmitter might be even longer than the one of an active configuration for some values of the photon number distribution p n and of the parameter η A (see, for instance, the dashed line in Fig. 9 ). Let us emphasize, moreover, that, as discussed above, in our security analysis we assume that multiphoton signals are always insecure (which is actually true only in the case of an active device), and, therefore, there might be still further room for improvement in the secret (11) in logarithmic scale for the passive setup illustrated in Fig. 7 with imperfect SPS. The photon number distribution pn of the sources is given by p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.785, and p2 = 1 − p0 − p1 = 0.015. We further assume the same experimental data used in Fig. 8 . We study three cases, depending on the actual value of the efficiency ηA of Alice's detectors, and we optimize the transmittance t of the BS's on Alice's side for each case. In particular, we assume ηA = 1 (dashed line), ηA = 0.5 (thin solid line), and ηA = 0.1 (dash-dotted line). The solid line represents a lower bound on R when Alice employs an active source with photon number distribution pn in combination with a BS. In this last case, we optimize the value of the transmittance of the BS as a function of the distance.
key rate which can be achieved with a passive device.
The passive source shown in Fig. 7 might be an interesting alternative to implement the BB84 QKD protocol with practical SPS. However, let us mention that to date there are still two main experimental challenges that need to be overcomed in order to obtain relevant secret key rates with such a device. On the one hand, we need to develop single photon detectors with high quantum efficiency that can operate at high clock rate. This represents an interesting technological challenge, especially at telecom wavelengths where the efficiency of presentday single photon detectors lie typically at roughly 10-15%. In recent years, however, this field has advanced substantially and there are reasons to be optimistic; for instance, it has been shown lately that superconducting transition-edge sensor detectors can provide photon number resolving capabilities at telecom wavelengths with 95% efficiency and negligible noise [24] . At visible wavelengths, silicon avalanche photodiodes (APD) are already commercially available to offer high quantum efficiencies (up to about 70-80%) and low dark count rates. This last scenario, for example, is particularly relevant for freespace QKD. On the other hand, we need to design highquality on-demand SPS. Note that the photon number statistics used for simulations purposes in this section assume on-demand SPS that are still beyond our present experimental capability [25] . For instance, the normal- ized second-order correlation function g (2) and average photon number per pulsen of the sources used in Figs. 9 and 10 are, respectively, g (2) = 0.0039 andn = 0.992, and g (2) = 0.0452 andn = 0.815. Despite the remarkable progress that has been made in recent years to generate indistinguishable on demand single photons, nowadays sub-Poissonian sources have a normalized secondorder correlation function that lies typically between 0.05 and 0.2 [25] . However, the biggest experimental challenge here is to increase the achievable collection efficiency, which is usually below 10%. This means that the probability to obtain an empty pulse is still rather high, and thereforen is relatively small [25] . As a result, the acceptance probability p acc of the passive BB84 source shown in Fig. 7 would be also quite small. Alternatively, one may use heralded SPS based on a parametric down conversion process, where the emission of an individual photon is heralded by the detection of the twin-photon [26] . For instance, the photon number distributions of the sources used above can be generated with this type of sources. In this last case, however, the secret key rate formula should include an additional factor accounting for this detection probability. As a consequence, the final key rate can be substantially reduced.
To conclude this section, let as mention that (as in Sec. II B) instead of using the passive source illustrated in Fig. 7 , Alice could as well employ, for instance, the alternative scheme illustrated in Fig. 11 . This setup is similar to the one shown in Fig. 7 , but has only one photon source, which might make it more robust against side-channel attacks hidden in the imperfections of the light sources. The main idea is to replace four singlephoton pulses (with different polarizations) emitted by four SPS by one four-photon pulse (with all their photons prepared in the same polarization state) together with polarization rotators. The argumentation here goes similar to the passive device presented in Fig. 7 , and we omit it for simplicity. The resulting secret key rate in this scenario, however, might be lower than that in the passive setup analyzed in Sec. III, since now the probability p acc to consider an output pulse as valid is also lower. Note that the passive scheme shown in Fig. 11 has the additional requirement that each photon of a four-photon pulse needs to follow a different optical path, which is selected by means of 50 : 50 BS's. The photon number statistics of the output signals generated by both passive schemes are also different.
IV. CONCLUSION
Typical experimental realizations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols prepare the signal states by means of an active source. In this article, we have investigated two different methods to passively generate the signal states of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol. Our methods need only linear optical components and photodetectors, and represent an alternative to those active sources that use external-driven elements.
In particular, we have showed that both coherent light and practical single photon sources are suitable for passive generation of BB84 signals. In the asymptotic limit of an infinite long experiment, we have proved that the secret key rate delivered by a passive source with coherent light is similar to the one provided by an active source, thus showing the practical interest of the passive scheme. When Alice uses practical single photon sources, we have showed that the distance covered by a passive transmitter might be longer than the one of an active configuration. This result is caused by the capacity of the passive scheme to reduce the number of multiphoton emissions of the source via a post-selection mechanism.
The main focus of this paper has been polarizationbased realizations of the BB84 protocol, which are particularly relevant for free-space QKD. However, we have also showed that similar ideas can as well be applied to other practical scenarios with different signal encodings, like, for instance, those QKD experiments based on phase encoding, which are more suitable to use in combination with optical fibers.
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Appendix A: Bob's detection setup and channel model
In this Appendix we include a simple model to characterize Bob's detection device and the behavior of the quantum channel. This model is used in Sec. II and Sec. III to evaluate the performance of the two passive BB84 state preparation schemes that we present there.
For simplicity, in our calculations we shall consider that Bob employs an active BB84 detection setup. Note, however, that the results contained in Sec. II and Sec. III can be straightforwardly adapted to cover as well the case where Bob uses a detection apparatus with passive basis choice [12] .
Specifically, we assume that Bob's detection scheme consists of a polarization analyzer and a polarization shifter which effectively changes the polarization basis of the subsequent measurement. The polarization analyzer has two detectors, each of them monitoring the output of a PBS. These detectors are characterized by their detection efficiency η det and their dark count rate ǫ B [27] . Furthermore, we suppose that both detectors are equal, and cannot distinguish the number of photons of arrival signals. They provide only two possible outcomes: "click" (at least one photon is detected), and "no click" (no photon is detected in the pulse).
The action of such detection device can be described by two positive operator value measures (POVM), one for each of the two BB84 polarization bases β ∈ {l, c}, where l denotes a linear polarization basis and c is a circular polarization basis [28] . Each POVM contains four elements: G and G β 1 , give precisely one detection click (these are the desired measurements), and the last one, G β dc , gives rise to both detectors being triggered. These operators can be written as
where the operators
, and F β dc are defined below. Eq. (A1) assumes that the background rate, is, to a good approximation, independent of the signal detection. Moreover, for easiness of notation, we only consider a background contribution coming from dark counts of Bob's detectors and we neglect other background contributions like, for instance, stray light arising from timing pulses which are not completely filtered out in reception.
The definition of the operators F 
(1 − η sys ) n+m |n, m β n, m|,
with β ∈ {l, c}. The signals |n, m l (|n, m c ) represent the state which has n photons in the horizontal (circular left) polarization mode and m photons in the vertical (circular right) polarization mode. The parameter η sys denotes the overall transmittance of the system. This quantity can be written as
where η B denotes the overall transmittance of Bob's detection apparatus, i.e., η B includes the transmittance of any optical component within Bob's measurement device together with the efficiency η det of his detectors. The parameter η channel can be related with a transmission distance d measured in km for the given QKD scheme as
where α represents the loss coefficient of the channel (e.g., free-space, or an optical fiber) measured in dB/km. In this Appendix, we calculate the observed gain Q and error rate E for the passive QKD device introduced in Sec. II. For that, we use the channel model and detection apparatus described in Appendix A. In the scenario considered, it turns out that the gain is independent of the actual polarization of the signals ρ out,θ given by Eq. (6) and the basis β used to measure them. This parameter has the form
for all θ and β.
The calculation of E is slightly more involved, since the error rate varies depending on the value of the angle θ. By symmetry, however, we can restrict ourselves to investigate the QBER in only one of the valid regions illustrated in Fig. 3 ; note that the error rate is the same in all of them. For instance, let us consider the case where θ ∈ [7π/4 + Ω, π/4 − Ω] (which corresponds to the horizontal polarization interval), and let E θ denote the error rate of a signal state ρ out,θ in that region. This quantity can be written as 
The first term in the summation represents the probability that the signal hits the wrong detector on Bob's side, i.e., he observes a click in the detector associated with vertical polarization. The second term in Eq. (B2) is the probability to have a double click on his detection apparatus and assign to it a single click in the wrong detector. Using Eqs. (A1)-(A2), we have that E θ can be further simplified as
where
for all i ∈ {0, 1, dc}, and θ ∈ [7π/4+Ω, π/4−Ω]. In order to calculate the probabilities f i,θ we use Eqs. (3)- (7) to first rewrite the state ρ out,θ given by Eq. 
where |n, m l represents again the state which has n photons in the horizontal polarization mode and m in the vertical polarization mode. We obtain f 0,θ = e −ηsysµ − 1 + e 
and f dc,θ = 1 + e −ηsysµ − e 
The quantum bit error rate E is then given by
and we solve this equation numerically.
where |n, m j represents the state which has n photons in the polarization mode associated with the signal detector D j which did not click, and m photons in its orthogonal polarization mode. The functions g (n,m,k,l,w,w ′ ,r,s) and h (n,m,k,l,w,w ′ ,r,s) which appear in Eq. (C4) are defined, respectively, as g (n,m,k,l,w,w ′ ,r,s) = f (w,k,l) f (w ′ ,k,l) f (r,w,n) f (r,w ′ ,n) × f ( (1 − η det ) r+s g (n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s) × h (n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s) .
for all j. Finally, we have that the probability that Alice produces a valid output state, i.e., only three of her signal detectors D i click and D does not click, that we shall denote as p acc , is given by × g (n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s) h (n,m,k,l,w,w,r,s) .
Finally, the multiphoton probability of the source, p multi , is as well independent of the value of the polarization j. It can be obtained as
Tr |n, m j n, m|ρ out,j = 1 − p 0,0,j − p 0,1,j − p 1,0,j ,
where the probabilities p n,m,j are defined as p n,m,j ≡ n, m|ρ out,j |n, m j .
After a short calculation, we find that 
